A Very Simple Model of Conflict with Asymmetric Evaluations and Institutional Constraint by Raul Caruso
  1
A VERY SIMPLE MODEL OF CONFLICT WITH ASYMMETRIC 











This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where 
two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents conflict in 
order to appropriate a positive fraction of a stake. An institutional 
constraint is modelled through an exogenously fixed element as a 
feature of a modified Contest Success Function.  
However, this very simple model shows that even if conflicting 
agents are willing to commit themselves to ease the conflict joining 
an institutional setting they do not ‘disarm’. The findings of the 
model show that: (a) both agents prefer to settle under an 
institutional constraint if and only if an exogenous institutional fee 
is fixed under a critical value; (b) the critical value of the 
institutional fee is directly related to the evaluation of the stake each 
agent does retain; (c) the agents with a higher evaluation of the 
stake has a higher willingness to settle.    
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A VERY SIMPLE MODEL OF CONFLICT WITH ASYMMETRIC 




This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where 
two rational and risk-neutral opponents conflict in order to 
appropriate a positive fraction of a stake. The pioneering work on 
modelling conflict in recent economic literature is by Jack 
Hirshleifer, whose foundations are in Hirshleifer (1987, 1988, 1989). 
The economic theory of conflict1 rests to a large extent upon the 
assumption that agents involved in conflict interactions have to 
choose an optimal level of efforts or resources devoted to the 
unproductive activity of conflicts.  
Economic literature on conflict is also akin to both with rent-
seeking and contest models. The main difference between the conflict 
models and the rent-seeking and contest models is that conflict 
models are generally general equilibrium models whilst the latter are 
partial equilibrium models. This means that conflict models involve a 
trade-off between productive and unproductive activities and the 
contested prize (or the rent) is endogenous. That is, the stake of the 
conflict is interpreted as a joint production which depends upon the 
productive efforts of agents. At the same time the cost function is 
represented by the foregone production. In such a construction the 
larger the number of the agents the larger will be the ‘pie’ to be 
shared. Instead, in rent-seeking and contest models the prize (or the 
rent) is given exogenously. In such a case, even if the number of 
contestants becomes larger the rent does not change.2  
However, conflicts, contests and rent-seeking can be 
considered directly unproductive activities (DUP) in the spirit of the 
definition provided by Bhagwati (1982) that  proposes a general 
taxonomy for a broader range of economic activities which represent 
ways of making profit despite being directly unproductive. This is 
rationale behind the labelling directly unproductive profit-seeking 
activities (DUP). Their output is clearly zero in terms of the flow of 
goods and services entering a conventional utility function.  
This paper is intended to extend the literature on this subject 
dealing with two main points: (1) the incentives to settle peacefully 
                                                           
1 In more recent years several studies extended Hirshleifer’s basic model. 
See among others: Grossman (1991), Skaperdas (1992), Garfinkel (1994), 
Grossman and Kim (1995), Neary (1997), Anderton and Carter (1999), 
Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000).  
2 For a deep comparison of conflict and rent-seeking models see Hauken 
(2005).    3
under an institutional constraint; (2) the impact of asymmetry in 
evaluations on such willingness to settle.  
 
The following framework the stake of the conflict is exogenously fixed 
as in rent-seeking and contest models. The stake of the conflict can 
be interpreted in different ways. It might be for example a contested 
natural resource, a territory or a homogenous input. It is assumed 
that the evaluation of the stake is different. In particular, agent 1 has 
a higher evaluation than agent 2. Being a partial equilibrium model 
with an exogenous prize, it would fall into the category of rent-
seeking and contest models. However, what this paper draws from 
literature on conflict is the destructiveness of conflict itself. That is, 
even if agents contest over a positive stake they are able to get only a 
fraction of the contestable stake. Then, differently from rent-seeking 
and contest models throughout this paper I will assume that conflict 
is destructive. That is, a positive fraction of the contested stake will 
be destroyed in the conflict and an exogenous parameter will be used 
in order to capture this impact. The expected destruction of conflict 
captures exactly the idea of opportunity cost of conflict. Moreover, 
differently from rent-seeking and contest models there is no winner-
take-all mechanism. In particular, under the assumption of risk-
neutrality, agents interpret the outcome of the non-cooperative 
interaction as deterministic, giving each party control over a positive 
fraction of the contested stake in order to maximise its own payoff.  
Although this partial equilibrium model will not consider the 
traditional trade-off between ‘guns’ and ‘butter’ for sake of simplicity 
throughout the paper I will call ‘guns’ the efforts invested in 
appropriative activity. In a similar fashion I will call ‘pie’ the positive 
stake of the conflict.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In the first 
section the basic hypothesis, definitions and model are presented. In 
the second section, the basic model is extended following Garfinekl 
and Skaperdas (2000) in order to show the incentives to settle 
considering also the existence of an institutional constraint. In a third 
section, by means of comparative statics analysis the incentives to 
settle will be investigated. Eventually, the concluding remarks 
summarise the results and present suggestions for future research 
agenda.     
 
2.  THE CONFLICT INTERACTION 
 
There are two risk-neutral agents indexed by  2 1, = i . They conflict 
over a positive stake denoted by ( ) 2 1 0 , , , = ∞ ∈ i Vi . The agents have 
different evaluations of the stake in the conflict. Then, in this two-  4
agents model it is possible to write that 2 1, j;i,j i ; V V j i = ≠ ∀ ≠ . In order 
to appropriate the maximum positive fraction of the contested stake, 
say the ‘pie’, both agents expend efforts, say ‘guns’. Let  2 1, , = i zi  
denote the amount of violent efforts. The ‘guns’ are measured in the 
same units as the ‘pie’. The conflict is destructive, namely a 
destruction parameter denoted  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ β  captures the foregone 
fraction of the positive stake due to the violent activity. In other 
words, asβ increases, the conflict becomes less and less destructive. 
The destruction parameter can be interpreted as an  ex-ante 
perceived evaluation of conflict losses. Both agents share the same 
perception of expected destruction. Then, in their general form the 
payoff functions can be written as  ( ) 2 1, , , , = = i V z i i i i β π π .  
The outcome of the conflict is determined through a Contest Success 
function (hereafter CSF for brevity). It summarizes the relevant 
aspects of what Hirshleifer defines the technology of conflict. In 
particular, even if the CSF can take different forms, I apply the ratio 








= ,    for  2 1, = i and  i j ≠     (1) 
where, under the assumption of risk-neutrality  i p  denotes the 
proportion of appropriation going to agent ifor  2 , 1 = i  and follows 
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3 Hirshleifer (1989) analyses the different impact of two different function 
form for CSF: the ratio form and the logistic form. In the first case, the 
contest outcome depends upon the ratio of the efforts applied, whilst in the 
second case it depends upon the difference between the resources 











π         ( 2 . 2 )  
 
I assume 0 2 1 > >V V . That is, player 1 has a higher evaluation than 
player 2. Expending efforts in violence is costly according to a simple 
cost function () 2 1, , = = i z z c i i . The first order conditions for an 






























       ( 3 . 2 )  
 
Solving the first order conditions it is possible to get the equilibrium 





















=         ( 4 . 2 )  
 
Since  0 2 1 > >V V it follows that
* *
2 1 z z > . That is, the agent with a higher 
evaluation of the stake will expend more violent efforts than the 

























π         ( 5 . 2 )  
 
The agent with a higher evaluation of the stake will have a higher 
payoff than the opponent, namely
* *
2 1 π π > . 
 
2. CONFLICT AND SETTLEMENT WITH AN INSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRAINT 
 
Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) propose a model where the 
contestable stake can be disposed in one of two ways: through   6
conflict or through a peaceful and predefined division of the ‘pie’. The 
exploitation of violence plays a role in both cases: in case of breakout 
of a violent conflict, ‘guns’ would determine directly the positive 
fraction and then the attainable payoffs for each party; in case of a 
settlement they constitute a credible threat and they influence each 
party’s negotiating position and therefore again the share of the ‘pie’ 
ad the attainable payoffs of parties. Hence each agent’s share of the 
‘pie’ will be a weighted combination of two possible rules: (i) the CSF 
denoting the technology of conflict and (ii) a symmetric split-of-
surplus rule of division which is commonly indicated in the literature 
on bargaining as the appropriate axiomatic outcome. The relative 
weights are determined by the destruction parameter denoted 
by () 1 , 0 ∈ β . According to this construction, when a settlement occurs, 
it does arise only in the shadow of conflict borrowing an expression 
from Anderton and Carter. 
Caruso (2006) extends the Garfinkel-Skaperdas model in 
order to consider the existence of an institution committed to conflict 
management and resolution. The agents are assumed to join an 
institutional set of rules by giving up a certain amount of resources 
that would be spent for violent efforts. This behaviour is intended to 
modify the payoff functions of both agents. Throughout this paper I 
will callh the institutional fee. For analytical simplicity, it is assumed 
to be exogenous and equal for both contestants. Being exogenous, the 
institutional fee does fit more with a scenario where an institution 
already does exist and third parties are allowed to join it. At the same 
time it could also be interpreted as an exogenous reciprocal 
concession fixed by a mediator. Anyway, paying this institutional fee, 
agents also signal the intention to comply with obligations emerging 
under an institutional regime. The intuition behind the nature of 
such institutional fee relates to Boulding’s idea of ‘grant economy’ in 
integrative systems.4 The reduction of resources devoted to 
unproductive ‘guns’ is also a pillar of contractarian approach as 
expounded in Skogh and Stuart (1982).   
Let  () ∞ ∈ , 0 h denote the positive institutional fee. Therefore, the 
payoff functions now can be described in their general form as 




i , , , β π π = . The payoff function has as cornerstone a 
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4 Boulding expounded in a comprehensive manner the theory of ‘grants 
economics’ in Boulding et al. (1972) and in Boulding (1973).     7
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Then, the payoffs function in their functional specification become: 
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where the superscripts  ' 'ins denote the institutional scenario. In the 
CSF,  h can be considered a constant vector that affects the ordinary 
outcome of the contests.5 In the modified CSF the institutional fee 
decreases the impact of expenditures devoted to ‘guns’.  The first 
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5 As pointed out by Skaperdas (1996) this is not true for ‘logit’ form of CSF.    8
 
Solving the first order conditions the interior Nash equilibrium level 
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As above, it is simple to verify that
* *
2 1 z z > . Moreover, since  0 > h  by 
assumption the equilibrium level of guns after agents joined an 
institution is higher than in other scenario. Thus, the model suggests 
the following result: 
 
PROPOSITION  1:    If agents are asymmetric in evaluations of the 
stake and are both committed to join an institution through the 
disbursement of a positive equal and exogenous institutional fee, 
then (i) the agents with a higher evaluation of the stake will spend 
more in violent efforts than the opponent; (ii) both agents will 
expend more violent efforts than in pure conflict scenario. 
 
The Nash-equilibrium payoffs (denoted by stars superscripts on the 
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π       ( 1 1 . 2 )  
 
It would be simple to verify that also in this case 
ins ins
2 1 π π
* * > . That is, 
the agent with a higher evaluation of the stake will arm more than the 
rival. 
 
3. COMPARATIVE STATICS FOR A SETTLEMENT CONDITION 
 
Given the assumption of rationality agents will choose the strategy in 
order to maximize their payoffs. Hence, it is possible to say that each 
agent would prefer to settle with an institutional constraint if and 
only if the attainable payoffs are greater than payoffs achievable 
under pure conflict, namely if and only if: 
   9
2 1, ,
* * = > i i
ins
i π π         ( 1 2 )  
 
Inequality “(12)” does identify a settlement condition. That is, 
whenever it holds the agents will choose to settle with an institutional 
constraint although they still arm. Therefore, comparing equations 
“(5)” and “(11)”, re-arranging and manipulating the settlement 
condition becomes: 
 





< i V h i i
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       ( 1 3 )  
 
Inequality (12) expresses the settlement condition in relation to the 
institutional fee. More precisely,  the settlement condition holds if 
and only if the level of institutional fee is below a critical value * h . 
This can be interpreted in a broader sense as the willingness to settle 
of each agent. The critical value of each agent depends upon the 
valuations of the ‘pie’ it retains. Therefore, agents with different 
evaluations of contestable stake retain different willingness to settle. 
Then, since  2 1 V V > it would simple to say that
* *
2 1 h h > . Therefore, a 
settlement between parties under an institution will take place if only 
if the exogenous membership fee is fixed below the critical value for 
the party with a lower fraction of the contestable output. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: under an institution (a) both agents prefer to settle 
under an institutional constraint if and only if the exogenous 
institutional fee is fixed under a critical value; (b) the critical value 
of the institutional fee is directly related to the evaluation of the 
stake each agent does retain; (c) the agents with a higher evaluation 
of the stake has a higher willingness to settle.    
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This very simple model showed that even if conflicting agents are 
willing to commit themselves to solve the conflict through joining an 
institutional setting of rules they do not ‘disarm’. The reasonable 
explanation is in the traditional explanation for non-cooperative 
Nash equilibria. No agent is going to disarm because if one agent is 
going to lower its expenditure in ‘guns’ the other would prefer to 
increase it in order to appropriate a higher fraction of the contested 
‘pie’.  
However, at the same time both agents interpret as rational 
the strategy of settling under an institutional set of rules committed 
to solve the conflict. Such a strategy is feasible if and only if an 
exogenously-fixed  institutional fee lies below a critical value. The   10
critical value captures in some sense the willingness to settle of 
agents. Under the assumption of different evaluations of the 
contestable ‘pie’ agents show different willingness to settle. In 
particular, the agent with a higher willingness to settle is also the 
agent with a higher level of ‘guns’. For sake of simplicity, call this 
equilibrium ‘armed settlement’.   
Finally, this short paper is of course little more than a ‘spare 
part’ of a larger study to be developed. There is a large agenda for 
future research, mainly concerning how to relax some simplifying 
assumptions I employed throughout the work: (i) only two party 
interaction; (ii) full information; (iii) a not-decisive technology of 
conflict; (iv) no distinction between offensive and defensive 
technologies; (v) agents as unitary actors; (vi) risk-neutrality of both 
actors; (vii) no definition of market structure and prices. The 
formalization presented here is intended to be used towards the 
construction of broader models. The aim of the larger study is to 
enrich the theory of exchange between asymmetric economic agents 
taking into account the existence of appropriative activities from the 
start. Brilliant analyses have been presented by some scholars as 
Anderton and Carter (1999) and Anderson and Marcouiller (1997), 
but much remains to be done. This line of theoretical analysis, which 
considers conflict from the beginning, can have remarkable 
implications for the designing of economic policies in societies where 
conflict is a characteristic element. Consider for instance, the case of 
post-conflict societies, some LDC countries or mafia-infiltrated 
states.    11
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